The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism.

** DISPUTED ** The Rolling Proximity Identifier used in the Apple/Google Exposure Notification API beta through 2020-05-29 enables attackers to circumvent Bluetooth Smart Privacy because there is a secondary temporary UID. An attacker with access to Beacon or IoT networks can seamlessly track individual device movement via a Bluetooth LE discovery mechanism. NOTE: this is disputed because the specification states "The advertiser address, Rolling Proximity Identifier, and Associated Encrypted Metadata shall be changed synchronously so that they cannot be linked" and therefore the purported tracking actually cannot occur.

https://blog.google/documents/70/Exposure_Notification_-_Bluetooth_Specification_v1.2.2.pdf [No Types Assigned]