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Vulnerability Change Records for CVE-2019-19234

Change History

CVE Modified by MITRE 11/06/2023 10:07:36 PM

Action Type Old Value New Value
Changed Description
** DISPUTED ** In Sudo through 1.8.29, the fact that a user has been blocked (e.g., by using the ! character in the shadow file instead of a password hash) is not considered, allowing an attacker (who has access to a Runas ALL sudoer account) to impersonate any blocked user. NOTE: The software maintainer believes that this CVE is not valid. Disabling local password authentication for a user is not the same as disabling all access to that user--the user may still be able to login via other means (ssh key, kerberos, etc). Both the Linux shadow(5) and passwd(1) manuals are clear on this. Indeed it is a valid use case to have local accounts that are _only_ accessible via sudo and that cannot be logged into with a password. Sudo 1.8.30 added an optional setting to check the _shell_ of the target user (not the encrypted password!) against the contents of /etc/shells but that is not the same thing as preventing access to users with an invalid password hash.
In Sudo through 1.8.29, the fact that a user has been blocked (e.g., by using the ! character in the shadow file instead of a password hash) is not considered, allowing an attacker (who has access to a Runas ALL sudoer account) to impersonate any blocked user. NOTE: The software maintainer believes that this CVE is not valid. Disabling local password authentication for a user is not the same as disabling all access to that user--the user may still be able to login via other means (ssh key, kerberos, etc). Both the Linux shadow(5) and passwd(1) manuals are clear on this. Indeed it is a valid use case to have local accounts that are _only_ accessible via sudo and that cannot be logged into with a password. Sudo 1.8.30 added an optional setting to check the _shell_ of the target user (not the encrypted password!) against the contents of /etc/shells but that is not the same thing as preventing access to users with an invalid password hash
Added Reference

								
							
							
						
MITRE https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/I6TKF36KOQUVJNBHSVJFA7BU3CCEYD2F/ [No types assigned]
Added Reference

								
							
							
						
MITRE https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/IY6DZ7WMDKU4ZDML6MJLDAPG42B5WVUC/ [No types assigned]
Removed Reference
MITRE https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/I6TKF36KOQUVJNBHSVJFA7BU3CCEYD2F/

								
						
Removed Reference
MITRE https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/IY6DZ7WMDKU4ZDML6MJLDAPG42B5WVUC/